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ROSENBERGER V. RECTOR & BOARD OF VISITORS
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA: A BATTLE
BETWEEN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
PRINCIPLES AND FIRST AMENDMENT
CLAUSES FURTHER WEAKENS THE WALL
OF SEPARATION
INTRODUCrION
Since the first case in which the United States Supreme Court seri-
ously contemplated using the Establishment Clause1 to strike down
government action,2 the Court has charted a nomadic course through
its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Examples of the confusion
that this inconsistency has caused are replete in Establishment Clause
cases. As one commentator noted:
Large property tax exemptions for churches are appropriately secu-
lar and nonentangling while small-scale tax "credit" schemes reim-
bursing parents of private school children for some portion of
secular educational expenses have too great a religious "effect."
"Deduction" schemes (as subtly distinguished from "credit"
schemes) nonetheless have [withstood] [E]stablishment [C]lause
challenge. The Court has held direct financial grants to religious
schools unconstitutional when intended to be used as salary supple-
ments for teachers or when used for maintenance and repair of
buildings, but it has also held construction grants constitutional
where the buildings involved were restricted to "secular uses." The
Court has found it unconstitutional for a state to reimburse private
religious schools for the cost of textbooks and instructional materi-
als, but it is constitutional for a state to permit parents of children
attending private schools to take a tax deduction for the same ex-
penses or for the state to loan the textbooks directly to the
students.3
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3. Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Ap-
proach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 316 (1986) (citations
omitted); see also Jay A. Sekulow et al., Religious Freedom and the First Self-Evident Truth:
Equality as a Guiding Principle in Interpreting the Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. J.
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Much of this dizzying array of Establishment Clause inconsistency is
owed to the Court's misapplication of the neutrality principle4 and the
direct-funding prohibition.5 In Rosenberger v. Rector & Board of Visi-
tors of the University of Virginia,6 the Court continued its unpredict-
able pattern, holding that the University of Virginia must make its
mandatory student fees available to a student organization publishing
a religious magazine. 7 In what Justice O'Connor deemed a "collision"
between neutrality and direct funding, neutrality won.8
The Rosenberger case involved two competing concepts-the once
absolute prohibition of directly funding religious institutions and the
permissible neutral extension of benefits to religious organizations.
Part I of this Note begins by identifying these two principles by refer-
ence to the landmark decision in Everson v. Board of Education,9 a
decision that allowed a state to pay for transportation to religious
schools because the aid was given under religion-neutral criteria.10
Part I then traces the development of what the Court deems to be
unconstitutional direct aid to religion,11 as contrasted with what the
Court deems to be indirect aid that neutrally and incidentally benefits
religious organizations.' 2 Specifically, Part I discusses several cases
that have failed the Establishment Clause test announced in Lemon v.
Kurtzman'3 and, therefore, constituted direct aid to religion. Part I
concludes with an overview of three dominant models of neutrality
that have found their way into Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and have been used to uphold funding programs that benefited
religion.' 4
351, 353 (1995) (noting that the Court's Establishment Clause cases "are often logically incom-
prehensible ... [and] irreconcilable from one case to the next").
4. See infra notes 72-108 and accompanying text (discussing three models of neutrality which
have emerged from the Court's Establishment Clause case law).
5. See infra notes 29-58 and accompanying text (developing what the Court deems to be pro-
hibited direct funding of religion through an analysis of three significant Establishment Clause
cases).
6. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
7. Id. at 2522-23, 2525. The Court reached the Establishment Clause issue because the univer-
sity argued that it was necessary to bar the magazine from funding in order to avoid an establish-
ment of religion. Id. at 2520-21.
8. Id. at 2528 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
10. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision).
11. See infra notes 29-58 and accompanying text (discussing the direct-funding prohibition);
see also School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) (holding that a school
district's funding programs were no different than a direct cash subsidy to a religious school).
12. See infra notes 72-108 and accompanying text (discussing three different models of neu-
trality used by the Court).
13. See infra notes 29-31, 38-42 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon decision).
14. See infra notes 72-108 and accompanying text.
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The majority and dissenting opinions in Rosenberger continued the
Court's trend of using the direct-funding and neutrality principles as
opposing absolutes. 15 Part II discusses the use of direct funding and
neutrality in the majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions in Ro-
senberger.16 Part III begins by proffering that the Court's use of direct
funding and neutrality as opposing absolutes was misguided in that
both "absolutes" stem from the same constitutional mandate-reli-
gious neutrality. 17 Part III concludes that the presence of a Free
Speech right in Establishment Clause cases significantly reduces the
showing of neutrality required to uphold a funding statute.I8 While
the Court's misapplication of the direct-funding and neutrality princi-
ples makes the Court's analysis of the Establishment Clause confus-
ing,19 Part IV concludes that Rosenberger's most significant impact
will be upon the Court's treatment of the relationship between the
Free Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. 20
I. BACKGROUND
A. Everson v. Board of Education-Laying the Groundwork for
Direct Funding and Neutrality
In what was perhaps the first case in modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, Justice Black eloquently penned the principle known as
the "wall of separation" between Church and State:
The "establishment of religion" . . . means at least this: Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one reli-
gion over another .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion .... In the words of [Thomas] Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a
wall of separation between Church and State. '21
Despite these strict words, Justice Black proceeded to open a "neu-
trality" door in this theoretical wall, noting that although the govern-
ment must be cautious not to have state-established churches, the
15. See infra notes 152-210 and accompanying text (breaking the decisions into a discussion of
direct funding and neutrality).
16. See infra notes 152-210 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 211-48 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 249-84 and accompanying text (arguing that the Free Speech right caused
the Court's Establishment Clause analysis to be less rigorous).
19. See infra notes 213-36 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 285-91 and accompanying text.
21. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
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prohibition is not meant to disallow extending government benefits to
all citizens on an equal basis.22 In other words, the Establishment
Clause "does not require the state to be [religion's] adversary. '2 3 Us-
ing this rationale, the majority in Everson upheld a New Jersey statute
authorizing local school districts to expend money for school bus
transportation for children attending religious schools.2 4 The Court
recognized that by upholding the funding statute, the possibility ex-
isted that some children might attend sectarian schools who would not
have attended absent the free bus service.25
Everson identified two concepts which form the foundation of the
anti-establishment principle. In a constitutional area with "few abso-
lutes," the Court has used one of these principles as a rallying cry: the
government may not directly fund religion nor religious institutions.2 6
Similarly, neutrality, the second concept which Everson identified, has
had an enormous impact on the Court's Establishment Clause
decisions.27
Before delving into the application of these two principles in the
Rosenberger decision, it is necessary to trace their development
through the Court's Establishment Clause case law. To clarify what
constitutes direct funding, the following subsection discusses several
cases in which aid to religious institutions has been deemed to be di-
rect, as opposed to aid that incidentally benefits a religion. Subsection
C, in contrast, discusses cases in which the Court held that aid to reli-
22. Id. at 16.
23. Id. at 18. The Court has continued to be wary of the potentially hostile treatment that
religion, religious ideas, and religious organizations can receive as a result of what the govern-
ment believes is required by the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114
S. Ct. 2481, 2498 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The Religion Clauses prohibit the govern-
ment from favoring religion, but they provide no warrant for discriminating against religion.");
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ("Our prior holdings do not call for total separa-
tion between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense."); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (noting that with total separation "state and religion would be
aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly").
24. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3, 18. Under the authority of the statute, funds were provided for
transportation to and from Catholic schools as well as public schools. Id. at 3. The Court com-
pared this bus service to protecting children from traffic hazards, patrolling school grounds with
police, providing fire protection, and allowing the religious schools to use public sewage systems.
Id. at 17-18.
25. Id. at 17.
26. See, e.g., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) ("Although Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely pro-
hibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a
particular religious faith.").
27. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (permit-
ting the neutral extension of vocational assistance to a blind person studying at a private Chris-
tian college).
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gion was neutral and, therefore, constitutional, and assimilates the
cases into three models of neutrality used by the Court throughout the
years.28
B. The Direct-Funding Prohibition
Justice Black's warning against direct funding abounds throughout
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The seminal case in
which the Court invalidated this kind of "direct support" was Lemon
v. Kurtzman,29 in which Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
penned what is now dubiously known as the "Lemon test. ' 30 Chief
Justice Burger described the test in the following manner: "[f]irst, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.' ' 31
Between 1973 and the early 1990's, the Court used the Lemon test
as the focal point of its Establishment Clause decisions. 32 Since 1992,
however, the Court has become uneasy with the inflexibility which
results from strict adherence to the Lemon test.33 While the Lemon
test as a stringent, three-part Establishment Clause test has proven to
28. See infra notes 72-108 and accompanying text.
29. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
30. See infra notes 285-86 (listing a sampling of the academic commentary generated by the
Lemon decision).
31. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (cita-
tions omitted)). Although Lemon clearly articulated the three-prong test for the first time, the
Lemon test is more accurately a synthesis of separate policy considerations used in the Court's
prior decisions. In School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the
Court used the following two-step test to evaluate government action: "[W]hat are the purpose
and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion
then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution."
Id. at 222. In Walz, the Court examined the purpose and effect of the governmental action at
issue. 397 U.S. at 669-72. In addition, the Court added a third step to its Establishment Clause
analysis which assessed the resultant "degree" of government involvement with religion to en-
sure that "the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion." Id. at 674. Thus, while the "test" is now known as the "Lemon test," the First
Amendment policies which the test purported to articulate were recognized long before Lemon.
32. In 1992, Justice Blackmun noted that between 1971 and 1992, only one of the Court's
thirty-one Establishment Clause cases was decided without reference to the basic principles de-
scribed in Lemon. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 603 n.4 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (re-
ferring to Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
33. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (using the Lemon test only as a
"helpful signpost"); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (same); Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (disregarding the Lemon
test altogether, but using its principles as a framework for its analysis).
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be unworkable,34 the policies35 that underlie the test will continue to
be used to demarcate what is constitutional aid to religion and what is
prohibited establishment of religion. Analyzing the Court's applica-
tion of the Lemon test in its case law lends insight into what the Court
deems to be unconstitutional direct funding of religion. Three cases in
particular-Lemon, Aguilar v. Felton,36 and School District of Grand
Rapids v. Ball37-provide insight into the types of funding programs
the Court has deemed to provide too direct of a benefit to religion to
pass constitutional muster.
At issue in Lemon were two similar state-aid plans: a Rhode Island
program which provided salary supplements to private school instruc-
tors teaching wholly secular courses, 38 and a Pennsylvania program
which reimbursed private schools for teachers' salaries, books, and
other teaching materials used for secular classes. 39 The Court found
that both statutes violated the test's third prong because their "very
nature [was] apt to entangle the state in details of administration. '40
In regard to the Rhode Island statute, the Court found that the admin-
istration of the religious schools in the state could not be separated
from the religious functions of the schools without substantial govern-
ment supervision. 41 Similarly, in discussing the Pennsylvania statute,
the Court found that the nature of the Pennsylvania private schools
was so permeated by religion that excessive government involvement
would be required to ensure that state aid went only to secular activi-
ties.42 Thus, both statutes were struck down as unconstitutional viola-
tions of the Establishment Clause.
34. Justice Scalia's concurrence in Lamb's Chapel provides an oft-quoted condemnation of
the Lemon test: "[like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and... attorneys .. " 508
U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted that when the Court "wish[es] to strike
down a practice it forbids, [the Court] invokes [Lemon]," and "when [the Court] wish[es] to
uphold a practice it forbids, [the Court] ignore[s] it entirely." Id. at 399.
35. For purposes of this Note, the two policies that underly the Lemon test are the desire to
neither advance nor inhibit religion and the goal to keep government involvement with religion
to a minimum. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
36. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
37. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
38. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-09.
39. Id. at 609-11.
40. Id. at 615 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 695). Ironically, although the Court framed its "test" as
a three-part inquiry, the Court passed over the second prong of the test because the third prong
of the test was so clearly violated. See id. at 613-14.
41. See id. at 615, 619-20.
42. See id. at 621-22.
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In two companion cases decided in 1985, the Court struck down aid
schemes which involved the use of federal funds to send public school
instructors to teach courses at private schools.43 In Aguilar v. Felton,44
the city of New York used federal funds to pay public school teachers
to teach courses such as remedial reading, remedial math, and English
as a second language to "educationally deprived children from low-
income families. 45 In holding the provision unconstitutional, the
majority found that the "critical elements of ... entanglement" were
evident.46 First, the aid was used in a "pervasively sectarian environ-
ment" 47 in schools that the Court of Appeals had characterized as
"[having as their] substantial purpose the inculcation of religious val-
ues."'48 Second, excessive monitoring was required to keep the reli-
gious element out of the classrooms. 49
Aguilar's companion case, School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball,50
used the effects test, and not the entanglement test, to strike down two
statutes similar to the scheme considered in Aguilar. The School Dis-
trict of Grand Rapids' Shared Time program financed "remedial" and
"enrichment" programs by providing public school teachers and leas-
ing private school classrooms;51 similarly, its Community Education
program offered secular courses not available at the private schools
and leased classrooms from the schools in which the courses were
taught. 52 None of the participants in the program were public-school
43. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985).
44. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
45. Id. at 404, 406. The classes were all taught at parochial schools. Id. at 406.
46. Id. at 412.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 406 (quoting Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 68 (2d
Cir. 1984)). Both the majority and the Court of Appeals were characterizing the individual
institutions as opposed to the entire class of recipients. Only 13.2% of the students eligible to
receive funds in 1981-82 attended private schools. Id. The Court found that the schools subject
to controversy were primarily sectarian because they were controlled by churches, compelled
students to attend church exercises, and favored admitting students of their own denomination.
Id. at 412.
49. Id. The monitoring to which the Court referred involved sporadic unannounced visits
from supervisors and program coordinators. Id. at 407. The classrooms were also cleared of all
religious symbols and the individual teachers were instructed to avoid involvement with religious
activities. Id. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted that the no-entanglement test often creates
a "'Catch-22' paradox ... whereby aid must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the
supervision itself... [can] cause an entanglement." Id. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
50. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
51. Id. at 375-76. Several of the teachers were actually former employees of the religiously
affiliated schools at which they were being paid to teach. Id. at 376.
52. Id. at 376-77. Some of the courses offered were home economics, Spanish, drama, and
nature appreciation. Id. Again, many of the teachers were employees or former employees of
the particular religiously affiliated school at which they taught. Id. at 377.
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children.53 Forty of the forty-one schools at which the classes were
held were characterized as "pervasively sectarian" by the majority.5 4
Thus, the Court found that the programs created a "symbolic link be-
tween government and religion" and thereby ruled that Lemon's ef-
fects prong was violated.55 The Court viewed the Michigan programs
as "indistinguishable from the provision of a direct cash subsidy to the
religious school that is most clearly prohibited under the Establish-
ment Clause. '56
While this discussion of Lemon, Aguilar, and Ball provides only a
cursory review of the direct-funding prohibition, the cases illustrate
that the Court has been primarily concerned with two aspects of fund-
ing programs. First, funding schemes are deemed to be direct when
the recipients of aid are predominantly sectarian in nature.5 7 Second,
funding of activities with both religious and nonreligious purposes is
deemed to flow directly to the religious activities of the organizations
if the government cannot, without some degree of certainty, deter-
53. Id. at 378.
54. Id. at 379. The Court found that "a substantial portion of [the schools'] functions [were]
subsumed in the religious mission." Id. (quoting Americans United for Separation of Church &
State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 546 F. Supp. 1071, 1084 (W.D. Mich. 1982)). Parents of
the children enrolled in these schools either had to be members of the schools' particular faith or
to pledge to have their children taught in accordance with the faith's teachings. Id. The regular
curriculum at many of the schools included prayers and attendance at religious services. Id. at
384 n.6 (citing School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 546 F. Supp. at 1080-84).
55. Id. at 385. The Court's effects analysis indicated that a program's theoretical-as opposed
to actual-effect can also run afoul of Lemon. See id. at 388-89 (declining to look for actual
evidence of religious indoctrination, using as a substitute the possible or potential results). The
Court refers to this "symbolic link" as an endorsement of religion. Id. at 397. Since the Ball
decision, the "endorsement test" has reappeared sporadically in the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct.
2440 (1995); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
Violations of the Lemon test's effects prong also invalidated the state-aid schemes at issue in
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyguist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), and Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). In Levitt, the Court deter-
mined that reimbursements for testing expenses were "direct money grant[s]" to religious
schools because the money could be used for state-prepared as well as teacher-prepared tests
and could possibly have "inculcated[d] students in the religious precepts of the sponsoring
Church." Levitt, 413 U.S. at 474-77, 480. Similarly, in Nyguist, repair and tuition grants to pri-
vate schools were deemed to be unconstitutional because they potentially could be used for
sectarian purposes, and because the financial support used for secular purposes necessarily left
the private schools more funds to be used for religious purposes. See Nyguist, 413 U.S. at 779-83.
56. Ball, 473 U.S. at 395.
57. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364 (1975) (invalidating part of an aid program
in which a majority of schools eligible to receive aid were religiously affiliated).
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mine to which purpose the benefit accrues. 58 The remainder of Part I
discusses three models of neutrality that the Court has used to cancel
out what otherwise would be deemed the direct funding of religion.
C. The Neutrality Door
In contrast to the "direct aid" cases discussed above, the Court has
used a neutrality door through which a state can pass through the
"wall of separation," and thereby provide indirect aid to religious in-
stitutions. The neutrality concept recognized in Everson has largely
appeared in the Court's Establishment Clause cases as one or more of
three models of neutrality:59 (1) neutrality, as determined by the abil-
ity to easily separate an institution's secular functions from its sectar-
ian functions; 60 (2) neutrality, in that government benefits to religious
institutions are insulated-in most cases, by way of an individual's
free choice; 61 and (3) neutrality, as evidenced by the diversity of the
class receiving the government aid.62
In the cases that follow, laws that directly advance or inhibit reli-
gion are distinguished from laws that are neutral towards religion,
while incidentally providing some degree of assistance or preference
to religious organizations. Funding programs which are neutral to
religion are the only constitutional means by which a state can provide
financial aid to religion. The first subsection below identifies the
traditional neutrality doctrine by comparing two early cases in which
neutrality was discussed. In the second subsection, the author groups
neutrality cases into three "models" of neutrality which have domi-
nated the Court's Establishment Clause case law.
1. The Traditional Neutrality Doctrine
Defining "neutrality" seems relatively simple; however, it is not.
Two cases, one from the 1970's and one from the 1980's, developed
the notion of what constitutes a neutral aid scheme that incidentally
58. See, e.g., id. at 361-63 (finding that "the direct loan of instructional material and equip-
ment ha[d] the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion because of the predomi-
nantly religious character of the schools [receiving the aid]").
59. These models of neutrality are based upon what this author believes was the dominant
showing of neutrality in each cited case. The three models are not intended to be an exhaustive
list of factors that the Court uses to determine whether a religious-aid statute is neutral. Further,
the cases in the following subsections are intended only to be representative of the dominant
factor of "neutrality" discussed by the Court in each opinion. Other indicia of neutrality were
considered by the Court in each case.
60. See infra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
19971
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benefits religion. In Walz v. Tax Commission,63 Chief Justice Burger
began the majority opinion with the instruction that the Establishment
Clause was intended to be "productive of a benevolent neutrality
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and
without interference." 64 Chief Justice Burger recognized that neutral-
ity as a rigid Establishment Clause test would be difficult to control,
but because religion has an important place in the "pluralism of
American society," religious organizations should not be afforded un-
equal treamtent. 65 Thus, in evaluating a property tax exemption given
to religious organizations that used property solely for religious wor-
ship, the Court considered a number of factors including the purpose
of the exemption and the exemption's equal treatment of different
religious groups.66 Ultimately, the exemption was characterized as
"simply sparing the exercise of religion from the burden [of property
taxes]."'67
In contrast, the Court in Larson v. Valente struck down a Minnesota
statute as an impermissible preference of some religious groups over
others.68 In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan reiterated Walz's
theme of "benevolent neutrality," noting that the "clearest command"
of the Establishment Clause is that one religious group must not be
preferred over another, nor may religion be preferred over nonreli-
gion.69 At issue was a statute that required certain religious organiza-
tions to adhere to stringent registration and reporting requirements-
only groups that solicited more than fifty percent of their funds from
nonmembers were subject to the statute's requirements. 70 The Court
reasoned that when any such preference of some religious organiza-
tions over others occurs, or when religion is preferred to nonreligion,
the program in question is suspect and is not likely to pass Establish-
ment Clause review.71
Taken together, Walz and Larson formulate the principle known as
"religious neutrality." Throughout their analysis, the Court developed
63. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
64. Id. at 669; see also ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT
NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 1987) (discussing this "be-
nevolent neutrality" in the context of the Supreme Court's case law).
65. 397 U.S. at 669, 687-89.
66. See id. at 678-80, 687-89.
67. Id. at 673.
68. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
69. Id. at 244.
70. Id. at 230.
71. See id. at 246. Interestingly, the majority in Larson averred that a strict scrutiny-like re-
view of the statute, instead of the Lemon test, should be used in cases in which laws are not
neutral to religion. See id. at 252.
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and approved the notion of permissible state accommodations of reli-
gion on a neutral basis. The following subsections trace this principle
of neutrality through several of the Court's Establishment Clause de-
cisions. In different cases, the Court has looked to different indicia to
determine whether an aid program acts to advance or inhibit religion.
The following subsections group several cases dealing with funding
programs according to the dominant models of neutrality used by the
Court to find the programs at issue constitutional.
2. Separability of Sectarian and Secular Functions
One model of neutrality, which the Court has relied upon in its Es-
tablishment Clause case law, is the ease of separability between the
religious functions and nonreligious functions of a benefited religious
institution. Long before Everson72 was decided, the Court used this
model of neutrality to uphold aid to a corporation which, despite be-
ing entirely composed of members of a Roman Catholic sisterhood,
was limited by its corporate charter to the wholly secular purpose of
operating a charitable hospital.73
The Court continued to use the separability model of neutrality af-
ter Everson. In 1971, a plurality used the Lemon test in Tilton v. Rich-
ardson74 to uphold a federal grant program for the construction of
"academic facilities" at private colleges, including some church-re-
lated schools. 75 The Act authorizing the grants included a restriction
that the facilities not be used for any religious purpose. 76 The four
colleges in question in Tilton were controlled by Roman Catholic or-
ganizations and performed "admittedly religious functions. '77 The
Court, however, upheld the grant program because the secular use to
which the funds were put was easily separated from religious indoctri-
nation.78 In addition, the Court found that the risk of excessive gov-
72. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Everson decision).
73. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297 (1899).
74. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
75. Id. at 675, 689.
76. Id. at 675. The Act prohibited funding for "any facility used or to be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place for religious worship, or... any facility which.., is used or to be used
primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity ......
Id. (quoting Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, 20 U.S.C. § 751(a)(2)(1964 ed., Supp. V)).
The facilities at issue in Tilton were two libraries, a language laboratory, a science building, and a
performing arts building. Id. at 681.
77. Id. at 686-87.




ernment entanglement was de minimis due to the fact that it was a
"one-time, single-purpose construction grant. ' 79
Two years later, in Hunt v. McNair,80 a South Carolina taxpayer
brought an action challenging a state statute which authorized a fi-
nancing transaction that benefited a Baptist college.8' In its applica-
tion for financial aid, the college specified that it needed revenue
bonds totaling $1,250,000 to fund short-term financing of capital im-
provements and to complete a dining facility on campus. 82 Justice
Powell articulated the separability model of neutrality in this way:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing
religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so perva-
sive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the
religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in
an otherwise substantially secular setting.83
Thus, because the secular functions of the benefited colleges were eas-
ily separable from their religious affiliation, the statute was upheld.8 4
The Court has also used the separability-of-functions model of neu-
trality to uphold funding to nonpublic schools in the form of books
and other services85 and to review the provision of funds given to pri-
vate schools for counseling and educational services related to adoles-
cent sexuality and pregnancy.86 In effect, the entanglement prong of
79. Id. at 688.
80. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
81. Id. at 735-36. The college stood to receive a lower interest rate from state-issued bonds
than if the college had financed the project privately. Id. at 739. The statute included a term
prohibiting funding of "any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place of
religious worship or any facility which is used or to be used primarily in connection with any part
of the program of a school or department of divinity for any religious denomination." Id. at 736-
37 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-41.2(b) (Supp. 1971)).
82. Id. at 738.
83. Id. at 743.
84. See id. at 749; see also Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 737 (1976) (holding
that state subsidies to private schools were constitutional because the schools were not "perva-
sively sectarian" and were largely autonomous from their religious affiliates).
85. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Regarding certain therapeutic services provided
by an Ohio statute, the Court noted that the services would be performed at public schools, in
public centers, or in mobile units not located on private school grounds. Id. at 245. Because of
this location, the "pervasively sectarian atmosphere of the church-related school" was not pres-
ent and, therefore, the provision of the services would neither impermissibly advance religion
nor excessively entangle the state in religion. Id. at 247-48. However, the Court did invalidate
the loan of instructional materials and field trip transportation in Wolman because the provision
of secular material directly related to the educational function of the religious schools. Id. at
254. Therefore, it constituted direct aid to the "religious mission that [wa]s the only reason for
the schools' existence." Id. at 250 (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975)). The
Court was unable to distinguish this aid from a cash grant. Id. at 251.
86. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). Significantly, the Court recognized the overlap
of Church goals with State goals that often exists in the real world. Id. at 604 n.8. The Court
remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the "aid has been used to fund
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the Lemon test appears to be based, at least in part, upon this model
of neutrality. 87 However, like the entanglement prong of Lemon, the
separability-of-functions model of neutrality is a rather malleable
beast in that the amount of religious permeation, or lack thereof, re-
quired to fit within this model of neutrality is imprecise.
3. Individual Choice: Insulating the Government Aid
A second model of neutrality which the Court has used to uphold
benefits to religious institutions is based upon the notion that, while
the government cannot directly subsidize religion, the Establishment
Clause is not violated when an individual takes money given to him or
her by the government and passes it on to a religious organization.
Such was the case in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for
the Blind,88 where the Court upheld the State of Washington's exten-
sion of vocational assistance to a blind person studying to become a
pastor, missionary, or youth director at a private Christian college. 89
The Court noted that the program was made available generally with-
out regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian nature of the institution ben-
efited.90 Because the statute provided aid directly to the student who
then gave it to the educational institution, the aid was available re-
gardless of the recipient's choice of schools and, therefore, was consti-
tutional.91 Further, the Court emphasized that the program "create[d]
no financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian
education." 92
'specifically religious activities in an otherwise substantially secular setting."' Id. at 621 (quoting
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1978)). The Court also instructed the district court to con-
sider whether the beneficiaries were "pervasively sectarian," noting that mere affiliation with a
particular religion is not fatal in itself. Id.
87. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-20 (1971), the Court struck down a Rhode Is-
land statue that primarily aided Catholic schools which were "permeated by religion." The
schools were located near parish churches, religious education was considered part of their over-
all education process, and two-thirds of the teachers were nuns. Id.
88. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
89. Id. at 489; see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-92 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota
law allowing taxpayers to deduct certain educational expenses, even though the vast majority of
those tax deductions went to parents whose children attended sectarian schools). In Mueller,
the Court found determinative that all parents could deduct educational expenses whether their
children attended public or nonpublic schools, and that the public funds only became available
to the sectarian schools as a result of "numerous private choices of individual parents of school-
age children." Id. at 396-97, 399.
90. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487.
91. Id. at 486-89.
92. Id. at 488. The Court also emphasized that the decision to benefit the sectarian institu-
tions was a product of private decisions. "For example, a State may issue a paycheck to one of
its employees, who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to a religious institution, all
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The Court utilized the individual-choice model of neutrality most
recently in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.93 In Zobrest,
a five-Justice majority found constitutional the provision of an inter-
preter for a deaf sectarian school student under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).94 Both parties stipulated that it
was impossible to separate the religious from the nonreligious func-
tions of the school.95 However, the fact that this statute distributed
funds to individuals based upon their status as "handicapped," a reli-
gion-neutral qualification, was found to be determinative. 96 Because
the benefit to the secular school was a result of the individual parents'
decision and all money was awarded according to neutral criteria, the
IDEA was held constitutional. 97 The Court distinguished the provi-
sion of funds for an interpreter from a direct funding of religion by
noting first, that paying for an interpreter was not a direct subsidy to
the religious school, and second, that the school was not relieved of
any expense it would otherwise have had to pay to educate its
students.98
Zobrest and Witters demonstrate how the Court has relied upon the
individual-choice model of neutrality to uphold funding schemes
which benefit religious institutions. In effect, the Court has found that
individual choice somehow acts to insulate the government aid from
the religiously affiliated recipients. Like the separability-of-functions
model, the individual-choice model of neutrality rests on the same
policy that the entanglement prong of the Lemon test was designed to
protect-it takes the government out of funding decisions which aid
religion.
4. Diversity of Recipient Class
In the past several terms, the Court has focused on another model
of neutrality in which the diversity of the recipient class is used to
without constitutional barrier; and the State may do so even knowing that the employee so
intends to dispose of his salary." Id. at 486-87.
93. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
94. Id. at 3. For a more thorough discussion of the Zobrest decision, see Judith S. Rosen,
Note, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: Should the Wall Between Church and State
Come Crumbling Down? Funding Sign Language Interpreters and the First Amendment, 23
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 85 (1993).
95. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4 n.1.
96. Id. at 10. It should be noted that the petitioner's parents' decision was not swayed by the
initial denial of funding for the child's interpreter. The parents used their own money-in excess
of $7,000 per year-to complete the child's education while the case was pending. Id. at 4 n.3.
97. Id. at 10.
98. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12.
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gauge neutrality. 99 Such was the case in Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District'00 where the Court unanimously
held that a school district violated Lamb's Chapel's Free Speech right
by allowing after-hours access of school buildings to nonreligious pro-
grams while denying similar access to religious programs. 101 The
school district's argument that allowing religious groups to use the fa-
cilities would constitute an Establishment Clause violation and, there-
fore, justified the infringement on Free Speech, was dismissed. 10 2 The
Court resolved that the fact that the property had been used repeat-
edly by a variety of organizations dispelled any fear of an Establish-
ment Clause violation. 0 3
A similar situation was addressed in Board of Education of the
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.10 4 In Mergens, a high school
board's policy denied a student religious group access to school prop-
erty during non-school hours. 105 In striking down the school board
policy, the Court emphasized the fact that there were many student
groups at the school representing a variety of interests.'0 6
In both Lamb's Chapel and Mergens, the Court concluded that a
policy of neutrality, gauged by the diversity of the class receiving gov-
ernment aid, created no serious danger of an Establishment Clause
violation. 0 7 In effect, this model of neutrality utilizes the same policy
99. This is not meant to insinuate, however, that the diversity of the recipient class as a model
of neutrality is a novel idea. Cf. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 234 (1977) (noting that of 720
chartered nonpublic schools, all but 29 were sectarian, and more than 92% of the nonpublic
school students attended schools of one particular denomination); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 364 (1975) ("[O]f the 1,320 nonpublic schools.., that.., qualify for aid ... more than 75%
are church-related or religiously affiliated.").
100. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
101. Id. at 394. The decision reversed a New York appellate court's holding that a school
could not bar a student bible club from using the facilities that the school opened to other groups
for a variety of purposes. Id. at 391. The petitioners, Lamb's Chapel and its pastor, applied for
and were twice denied permission to use the school facilities to show a six-part film series con-
taining lectures from Doctor James Dobson. Id. at 387. The subject of the lectures was Dr.
Dobson's "views on the undermining influences of the media that could only be counterbalanced
by returning to traditional, Christian family values instilled at an early age." Id. at 388.
102. Id. at 395.
103. Id. at 396.
104. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
105. Id. at 231. The religious club in question, headed by the respondent, Bridget Mergens,
submitted that reading the Bible, discussing the Bible, and praying together was part of its pur-
pose. Id. at 232.
106. Id. at 252. The Court used this fact to infer that the policy had a primarily secular effect.
Id. The Court also noted that more entanglement might occur by attempting to prevent religious
speech by monitoring the meetings than would occur by simply allowing the meetings to take
place. Id. at 253.
107. The model of neutrality used in Lamb's Chapel and Mergens probably has its beginnings
in a Supreme Court case decided in 1981. In Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), the Court
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questions as the effects prong of Lemon. 08 Moreover, it appears that
the diversity-of-recipient-class model of neutrality would be satisfied
if the theoretical (i.e. not actual) recipients of state aid were diverse.
II. SUBJECT OPINION: ROSENBERGER V. RECTOR & BOARD OF
VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA' 0 9
As the survey of the United States Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence in Part I illustrates, several models of "neutral-
ity" have eroded the "wall of separation" over the past four decades.
Funding programs in which the beneficiary institution's character is
easily separable into religious, versus nonreligious, functions have
been deemed neutral.110 Similarly, aid schemes in which religious in-
stitutions are benefited only as a result of individual decisions have
been found to be neutral.1 1' Now, the Court's dominant reading of
"neutrality" seems to be shifting to a model based upon the diversity
of the class receiving aid." 2 However, until Rosenberger v. Rector &
Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia,1 3 no direct-funding
scheme had ever been held constitutional, regardless of the model of
neutrality employed by the Court.
In Rosenberger, neutrality was used to validate what appeared to be
a direct-funding scheme. 1 4 The University of Virginia used a fund
composed of mandatory student fees to help support various student
groups." 5 However, out of fear of violating the Establishment
Clause, the university denied funding to the petitioner's religious stu-
dent organization." 16 In a five-to-four decision," 7 the Court found
held that facilities opened for use by student groups could not be closed to religious student
groups without a violation of the students' Free Speech rights. Thus, because access to facilities
was granted to "a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers," the Court upheld the
university policy. Id. at 274.
108. See, e.g., Mergens, 496 U.S. at 252-53 (determining that aid available to a variety of stu-
dent groups constituted a secular effect).
109. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
110. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text (discussing funding to religious institutions
for nonreligious programs).
111. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text (discussing the permissibility of state fund-
ing, regardless of individual choices to benefit religion).
112. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text (explaining the Court's recent application
of this concept of neutrality).
113. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
114. See id. at 2533 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that "the majority's opinion ... acts to
approve the direct funding of a religious institution").
115. Id. at 2514.
116. Id. at 2515-16.
117. The majority in Rosenberger was composed of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, O'Connor,
Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer formed
the dissent. Justices O'Connor and Thomas filed separate, concurring opinions.
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that the university had infringed upon this organization's Free Speech
right by refusing it access to the funds.118 More significantly, the ma-
jority found that despite the possibility that the religious group would
receive direct funding as a result of its holding, there was no risk of an
Establishment Clause violation. 1 9
The following subsections discuss Rosenberger's majority and dis-
senting opinions, as well as Justice O'Connor's concurrence. 20 This
section begins by introducing the factual and procedural background
of the case. The Court's opinions then are broken down into two top-
ics: direct funding and neutrality. The dissent found the direct nature
of the funding in Rosenberger determinative. 12' In contrast, both the
majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence relied on neu-
trality, and the apparent indirectness of the funding scheme, to rule
that the university had to provide the student group with funding.' 22
As this discussion of Rosenberger develops, it becomes less clear
where the absence of direct funding ends and where the presence of
neutrality begins.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
At the University of Virginia, a student organization must cross
three hurdles to receive money from the Student Activities Fund
("SAF"), which is funded by a mandatory, fourteen-dollars-per-se-
mester fee imposed upon each full-time student. 23 First, the group
must register with the university as a Contracted Independent Organi-
zation ("CIO"), a status which is available to any group composed
118. See infra notes 249-84 and accompanying text (positing that the presence of a Free
Speech claim in Rosenberger had a significant impact upon the Court's Establishment Clause
analysis).
119. See infra notes 213-36 and accompanying text (arguing that the distinction between direct
funding and neutrality has created much confusion because of the Court's all-too-sweeping
utterances).
120. Generally speaking, there were two issues which the district court, appellate court, and
U.S. Supreme Court were forced to address. The first issue revolved around the classification of
the student funds as a public, nonpublic, or limited public forum. The second issue was whether
the University of Virginia's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation was sufficient
to justify the abridgement of the petitioners' Free Speech right.
Justice Thomas also filed a concurring opinion discussing the Establishment Clause issue. Ro-
senberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2528-33 (Thomas, J., concurring). However, Justice Thomas' opinion
dealt primarily with a historical analysis of the Establishment Clause and is beyond the scope of
this Note. Thus, Justice Thomas' concurrence is not discussed.
121. See infra notes 163-66, 171-78, 181-83 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 152-210 and accompanying text (explaining the differences in approach to
direct funding and neutrality between Justice Souter's dissent, the majority, and Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion).
123. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514-15.
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primarily of students and whose managing officers are full-time stu-
dents. 124 Fraternities and sororities, political and religious organiza-
tions, and any group whose membership is exclusionary are denied
CIO status. 125
Once designated a CIO, the group must prove that it fits into one of
the particular categories of CIOs which are eligible to apply for fund-
ing from the SAF.'2 6 In all, eleven categories of student groups are
permitted to seek payment from the SAF based upon their relation-
ship to the "educational purpose of the University of Virginia.' 12 7
Among those groups which received funding from the SAF prior to
the Rosenberger decision were the Muslim Student Association, the
Jewish Law Students Association, and the C.S. Lewis Society. 2 8
Finally, the student council, subject to review by a faculty body, dis-
tributes SAF funds to eligible CIOs according to the funding guide-
lines issued by the Rector and Board of Visitors of the University of
Virginia. 2 9 All payments from the SAF are made directly to creditors
of the student groups, as opposed to the groups themselves. 30
Wide Awake Productions ("WAP") was formed in 1990 by the peti-
tioner, Ronald Rosenberger, and became a CIO shortly thereafter. 131
As a CIO, WAP could use university facilities, including meeting
rooms and computers. 132 Significantly, by granting WAP the status of
CIO, the student counsel necessarily did not deem WAP to be a "reli-
124. Id. at 2514. There are actually four criteria for CIO status: (1) the group must be com-
posed of at least fifty-one percent students; (2) all officers of the group must be full-time, tuition-
paying students; (3) an updated copy of the group's constitution must be kept on file with the
university; and (4) the group must sign an anti-discrimination disclaimer. Rosenberger v. Rector
& Bd. of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 177 n.1 (W.D. Va. 1992). During the
1990-91 academic year, 343 student organizations registered for and qualified as CIOs. Id. at 180
n.7.
125. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 177.
126. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514. During the 1990-91 academic year, 135 CIOs applied for
SAF funding, and 118 received it. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 180 n.7.
127. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514.
128. Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 271 (4th Cir.
1994).
129. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514. The university is a state institution. Id. at 2511. There-
fore, any action that it takes is government action. See id. at 2512.
130. Id. at 2515.
131. Id. WAP's constitution described its three purposes as: (1) publishing a magazine of
philosophical and religious expression; (2) facilitating discussion which fosters an atmosphere of
sensitivity and tolerance of the Christian viewpoint; and (3) providing a unifying focus for Chris-
tians of multi-cultural backgrounds. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 177 n.3.
132. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514. This provision in the guidelines conforms to Lamb's
Chapel, which held that allowing religious organizations access to facilities which were open to a
number of groups was not a violation of the Establishment Clause. See supra notes 100-03, 107-
08 and accompanying text (discussing the Lamb's Chapel opinion).
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gious organization," described in the funding guidelines as "an organi-
zation whose purpose is to practice a devotion to an acknowledged
ultimate reality or deity."'1 33
As a CIO, WAP was eligible to, and did, apply for funding from the
SAF for its publication, Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the
University of Virginia ("Wide Awake"). 134 However, both the student
council and its faculty advisory board denied WAP its funding, based
entirely upon their classification of Wide Awake as a "religious activ-
ity."' 135 A "religious activity," as defined in the funding guidelines,
was any activity which "primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belief in or about a deity or ultimate reality."'1 36
Having exhausted all options in the university's system, Ronald Ro-
senberger, the founder and president of WAP, first brought suit in the
federal district court for the Western District of Virginia in 1992.137
There, the court upheld the restriction against funding religious activi-
ties, ruling that access to the SAF was a nonpublic forum upon which
the university had imposed reasonable restrictions.' 38 One of the
133. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
134. Id. The paper applied as a media group communicating "student news, information,
opinion, entertainment, or academic communications..." Id. at 2514. Media groups are one of
eleven categories of organizations eligible to apply for SAF funds, Id. Three issues of Wide
Awake were published prior to applying for funding or the instigation of suit, and approximately
5,000 copies were distributed free of charge to the university population. Rosenberger, 795 F.
Supp. at 177. A total of fifteen student publications were funded by the SAF during the 1990-91
academic year. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515.
135. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2515. Religious activities are one of several types of student
activities for which the guidelines prohibit funding. The guidelines also specify that political and
philanthropic activities, activities jeopardizing the university's tax-exempt status, payments of
honoraria, and social entertainment cannot receive funding. Id. at 2514.
136. Id. at 2519. WAP's paper, Wide Awake, has a proclaimed two-fold mission: "to challenge
Christians to live, in word and in deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage
students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means." Id. Members of
WAP acknowledged that the magazine was to provide "a Christian perspective on both personal
and community issues." Id. WAP's first published issue addressed racism, crisis pregnancy,
stress, prayer, and C.S. Lewis' ideas about evil and free will, and also contained reviews of reli-
gious music. Id. The second and third issues of the magazine included articles about homosexu-
ality, Christian mission work, and eating disorders. Id.
137. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 175.
138. Id. at 183. While an analysis of the infringement upon WAP's Free Speech right is be-
yond the scope of this Note, a brief review of the analysis which a Free Speech issue receives is in
order. While the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law [abridging] the
freedom of speech," the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that restraints on
free expression may be "permitted for appropriate reasons." See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 360 (1976).
In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983), the Court stated
that what constitutes "appropriate" restrictions on expression necessarily depends upon what
type of expression is being suppressed and where the expression is taking place. Accordingly, in
public fora, defined as "places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted
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"reasonable justifications" which the district court found was the uni-
versity's interest in maintaining a proper separation of Church and
State. 139 However, the court merely noted that the university's judg-
ment regarding the possible Establishment Clause violation was rea-
sonable and declined to second-guess the university's restriction.140
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision,
although on different grounds.14' In contrast to the district court, the
Fourth Circuit found that the University's speech discrimination was
content-based and, therefore, addressed the Establishment Clause is-
sue in its search for a compelling interest to justify the discrimina-
tion.142 Using the Lemon test, 43 the Fourth Circuit found that had
the university not excluded WAP from funding, it would have violated
both the effects and entanglement prongs of the Lemon test.1' In its
to assembly and debate[,]" the Court will allow a restriction of expression only if it is "content-
neutral, . . . narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave[s] open am-
ple alternative channels of communication." Id. at 45-46. Places such as sidewalks, United States
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983), and parks, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468
U.S. 288 (1984), are examples of public fora.
In contrast, a limited public forum "consists of public property ... opened for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. In limited public fora, even
content-based restrictions can be placed on expression as long as the restriction is "narrowly
drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest" and preserves the purpose of the limited forum.
Id. at 45-46. An example of a limited public forum is a state university's classroom that is
opened for student group activities. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
139. Rosenberger, 795 F. Supp. at 181.
140. Id. The district court did address WAP's Free Exercise claim, which neither the Fourth
Circuit nor the Supreme Court pursued. Id. at 182. It is interesting to note, as the district court
did, that WAP necessarily contended that its publication of Wide Awake was a religious practice
in order to argue that its Free Exercise rights were obstructed. Id. at 183 n.10. While it acknowl-
edged that WAP's publication of Wide Awake would have been easier had the university paid the
bills, the district court held that no "burden of Constitutional magnitude" was imposed upon the
group. Id. at 182.
141. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 269.
142. Id. at 281-82.
143. Id. at 282. The Fourth Circuit's elaboration on the use of the Lemon test is fairly typical
of the circuit courts' uncertainty in applying Lemon. Noting that at least four current U.S.
Supreme Court Justices (Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Rehnquist) have expressed their dis-
taste for Lemon, the Fourth Circuit half-heartedly conceded that it was "bound" to Lemon until
a majority of the Court either overruled or modified the test. Id. at 282 n.30.
144. Id. at 285. Reviewing the first prong of Lemon, the Fourth Circuit held that religious
concerns were not the sole motivating factor behind prohibiting funding of religious activities.
Id. at 284. In holding that the primary effect of eliminating the restriction would be the advance-
ment of religion, the appellate court focused on Wide Awake's character and the difficulty in
separating Wide Awake's sectarian purposes from its non-sectarian purposes. Id. at 285. The
Fourth Circuit noted that "[u]sing public funds to support a publication so clearly engaged in the
propagation of particular religious doctrines would constitute a patent Establishment Clause
violation." Id.
The appellate court's determination that the guidelines resulted in excessive entanglement of
Church and State also turned primarily on its characterization of Wide Awake. Id. According to
the Fourth Circuit, the possibility of annually appropriating for the benefit of a single religion
1997] ROSENBERGER 589
analysis, the appellate court averred that the latter was "most plainly
implicated in this case."'1 45
Thus, more than three years after first applying for funding from the
University of Virginia, Ronald Rosenberger and WAP petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari on the following question:
"[w]hether the Establishment Clause compels a state university to ex-
clude an otherwise eligible student publication from participation in a
student activities fund."'1 46
In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the Fourth Circuit's holding. 147 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Kennedy began his analysis by determining that the SAF was a
limited public forum 148 and that the prohibition of funding religious
activities unconstitutionally barred access to this forum based upon
viewpoint.149 The majority rejected the university's claim that deny-
ing funding to the paper was necessary to comply with the Establish-
ment Clause and held that providing WAP with funding would not be
an establishment of religion. 50
would not only be "politically divisive," but would also "send an unmistakably clear signal" that
the university supported and promoted the message which Wide Awake purveyed. Id. at 286. For
a more comprehensive review of the Lemon test and its underlying principles, see supra notes
29-42 and accompanying text.
145. Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 285.
146. Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2521 (1995).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2517-20. The majority held that the SAF was a limited public forum, although
"more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographical sense." Id.; see supra note 138 for a
discussion of why the Court's characterization of the student fund as a limited public forum was
important to its Free Speech analysis.
149. The majority's characterization of the university's Free Speech discrimination was perti-
nent to its decision. See infra notes 249-84 and accompanying text (positing that this Free Speech
claim had a substantial impact on the majority's Establishment Clause analysis). In contrast to
the Fourth Circuit's ruling that the discrimination was content-based, which is permissible at
times in limited public fora, the majority found that the university had employed viewpoint-
based discrimination, which is presumptively impermissible even in limited public fora. Rosen-
berger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517. Acknowledging that the demarcation between content and viewpoint
discrimination is far from precise, the majority relied on an analogy to Lamb's Chapel to find
that the university's discrimination was the latter. Id. at 2517-18. Thus, Justice Kennedy turned
to the university's Establishment Clause argument to determine whether complying with the
Constitution's prohibition against establishing religion justified the petitioners' speech depriva-
tion. Id. at 2520-21.
150. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2524. Although the Court granted certiorari on the issue of
whether the Establishment Clause justified the university from barring WAP access to the SAF,
the majority stated that the argument "lacked force." Id. at 2521. However, the issue seems
more debatable than the majority gives credit, as both concurrences addressed only that issue,
and the dissent would have found the issue dispositive. See infra notes 152-210 and accompany-
ing text (analyzing the majority opinion, dissent, and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in terms of
neutrality and direct funding).
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The following subsections break the majority, concurring, and dis-
senting opinions in Rosenberger into a discussion of direct funding and
neutrality. As the next subsections reveal, it was not always clear
when the majority and dissenting opinions were discussing neutrality
and when the opinions were discussing direct funding. Both the ma-
jority and the dissent used the terms "neutrality" and "direct funding"
as opposing absolutes. Only Justice O'Connor's concurrence treated
the two "absolutes" as one unified requirement of "religious neutral-
ity," which this Note proffers is the correct analysis. 151
B. Is Rosenberger a Direct Funding Case?
At first blush, the funding of WAP, now mandated by the holding in
Rosenberger, appears to be the type of direct funding of religion which
Justice Black so adamantly prohibited in Everson.152 In fact, Justice
Souter, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Breyer joined, writing for the Rosenberger dissent, began 153 and
ended 54 his analysis of the Establishment Clause issue by asserting
that the majority opinion effectively approved the direct funding of a
religious activity. Thus, according to the dissent, the possibility of uni-
versity funds reaching WAP's hands struck at the "heart of the prohi-
bition of establishment."'1 55 Of course, the majority did not agree with
the dissenters' characterization of the SAF as a direct funding of reli-
gion. Writing for the majority,156 Justice Kennedy found at least three
ways to distinguish funds which would flow to WAP from direct
funding.157
The majority's first distinction was based upon the perception that
the university was merely a conduit through which students pass
money to other students' activities. 58 Inherent in this theory was the
notion that the objective of the SAF was "to open a forum for speech
and to support various student enterprises ... in recognition of the
diversity and creativity of student life.' 59 Recognizing that the
151. See infra notes 213-36 and accompanying text (arguing that relying solely on the religious
neutrality of a funding scheme, based upon the value of neither inhibiting nor advancing reli-
gion, is the proper analysis).
152. See supra notes 21-58 and accompanying text (discussing both Everson and the direct-
funding prohibition in more detail).
153. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2533 (Souter, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2547.
155. Id. at 2538.
156. See supra note 117 (identifying the Justices which joined in the majority opinion).
157. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522-24.





mandatory student fees were exactions upon the students, 160 Justice
Kennedy distinguished this program from a "general tax" based upon
the limited use to which the funds could be put.161 Therefore, Justice
Kennedy cautioned readers not to view Rosenberger as "addressing an
expenditure from a general tax fund."'162
The dissent disagreed that the SAF and mandatory student fees
were distinguishable from a general tax. Justice Souter saw the
mandatory student fees as identical, at least in substance, to a tax as-
sessment used directly to aid religion.163 The mandatory nature of the
student fees carried all the indicia of a general tax, according to Justice
Souter.164 The dissent then noted that the majority's distinction from
a general tax was actually irrelevant. According to Justice Souter, us-
ing even non-tax revenues would violate one of the Establishment
Clause's "dual objectives" by contributing to "a corrupting depen-
dence on support from the [g]overnment."'1 65 Therefore, Justice Sou-
ter submitted that direct aid to religion is unconstitutional regardless
of the source of the funds.166
A second way in which Justice Kennedy and the majority distin-
guished the potential payments to WAP from direct funding was that
by making payments directly to third parties-as opposed to making
them to WAP, itself-the university somehow insulated itself from the
transaction.167 In this respect, Justice Kennedy drew an analogy to
two Establishment Clause cases, Widmar and Mergens. 68 Both
Widmar and Mergens held that opening meeting rooms for sectarian
groups and activities would not establish religion, even though gov-
160. The majority refused to address whether each student had a right to demand a return of
their contribution to the SAF if they did not subscribe to the opinion of the funded organiza-
tions. Id.
161. Id. This distinction was necessary because, according to the majority, a tax levied for the
direct aid of a church would "run contrary to Establishment Clause concerns dating from the
earliest days of the Republic." Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2538 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Fourth Circuit agreed with the dissenters' charac-
terization of the funding. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18
F.3d 269, 286 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that direct monetary subsidization of religious organizations
is "a beast of an entirely different color," as compared to direct non-monetary aid).
164. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2538 (Souter, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 2547. The Establishment Clause's other objective, according to the dissent, is to
"protect individuals and their republics from the destructive consequences of mixing government
and religion." Id.
166. Id. at 2546-47.
167. Justice O'Connor averred that this type of indirect payment ensured that the funds were
used only for activities consistent with the university's purpose of maintaining a "free and robust
marketplace of ideas." Id. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 2523; see supra note 107 (discussing Widmar); supra notes 104-07 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Mergens).
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ernment money might be used for the "upkeep, maintenance, and re-
pair of the facilities attributed to those uses. ' 169 Accordingly, Justice
Kennedy surmised that there was no practical difference between a
school using its funds to operate a facility to which all students have
access and paying third parties to operate the facility for the school. 170
Justice Souter, writing for the dissent, rejected the argument that
funneling the funds through the printer chosen by WAP somehow in-
sulated the university's action. 171 The dissent argued that the facts in
Rosenberger were not readily analogous to the forum-access cases be-
cause the SAF was not a traditional forum.172 Further, Justice Souter
distinguished Witters,173 Mueller,174 and Zobrest175 from Rosenberger
in that the choice to benefit religion in those cases was made by an
independent third-party standing between the government and the
religious institution. 7 6 Here, the third-party printer was not making
the decision whether to print a secular or nonsecular magazine. 7 7 In-
stead, the printer received money solely "because of its contract to
print a message of religious evangelism at the direction of [WAP]."' 178
Undaunted in its quest to distinguish the SAF funding from direct
funding, Justice Kennedy and the majority proffered a third reason
why Rosenberger should not be viewed as a direct funding case. Ac-
cording to Justice Kennedy, WAP was not even a religious organiza-
tion, "at least [not] in the usual sense of that term as used in [the
Court's] case law."1 79 The majority found the magazine to be merely
a publication through which ideas-albeit ideas that conformed to a
particular faith-were passed to the student body. 80
Not surprisingly, the majority's characterization of Wide Awake did
not escape criticism from the dissenting justices. Finding the Wide
Awake magazine to be nothing less than "straightforward exhortation
169. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981)).
170. Id. at 2524. The majority went on to note that perhaps the latter is better as it avoids
possible entanglement problems which might arise when a government entity operates the facil-
ity. Id.
171. Id. at 2546 (Souter, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the analogy "breaks down
entirely" because there is "no traditional street corner printing provided by the government on
equal terms to all comers." Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Witters decision).
174. See supra note 89 (discussing the Mueller decision).
175. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Zobrest decision).
176. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2544-45 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2545.
178. Id.




to enter into a relationship with God as revealed in Jesus Christ,"'181
Justice Souter asserted that the SAF funding of Wide Awake would be
"the direct subsidization of preaching the word [which] is categorically
forbidden under the Establishment Clause.' 82 Justice Souter im-
plored the majority to explore more thoroughly the nature of Wide
Awake, using several excerpts from the magazine's first three issues to
conclude that Wide Awake constituted "nothing other than the
preaching of the word, which (along with the sacraments) is what most
branches of Christianity offer those called to the religious life."'1 83
Justice O'Connor's view on the direct, versus indirect, nature of the
SAF funding landed squarely between Justice Souter's and Justice
Kennedy's opinions. Justice O'Connor referred to the case as "[lying]
at the intersection of the principle of government neutrality and the
prohibition on state funding of religious activities.' 84 While she de-
clined to piece the facts of the case into simple categories,185 Justice
O'Connor subtly expressed her opinion that the funding of WAP
would at least approach a forbidden direct funding of religion. 86
However, Justice O'Connor also noted that the possibility of the stu-
dents receiving a refund of their fees, if they did not want their money
to go to religious organizations, provided a potential basis for distin-
guishing the case from other direct-funding cases. 187
Why is it that the classification of Rosenberger as a direct, versus
indirect, funding case was so important? The answer to this question
determined whether and to what extent neutrality was considered by
181. Id. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Fourth Circuit agreed with Justice Souter's char-
acterization, noting that "[elven Wide Awake's physical appearance draws attention to its reli-
gious posture: the Christian symbol of the Cross, lying in a dark oval field, is printed at the top
of each page; another Cross marks the end of each contribution." Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd.
of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 273 (4th Cir. 1994).
182. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2535 (Souter, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2525; see infra notes 232-36 and accompanying text (arguing that Justice O'Connor
was the only Justice to recognize that the two principles are not opposing absolutes; rather, they
are two terms used to describe the same value of religious neutrality).
185. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2526 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
186. See id. at 2526-27 (arguing that while payments will be made to WAP as a result of the
holding, four factors led to the conclusion that the SAF funding would not convey a message of
endorsement to the student body).
187. Id. at 2527. Justice O'Connor referred to the split that currently exists in the lower courts
with regard to the possibility that such a pro-rata refund would be available. Id. Compare Smith
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 4 Cal. 4th 843, 863 (1993) (ordering a refund of mandatory
student fees to students objecting to the political and ideological activities for which their fees
were used), with Hayes County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 123 (5th Cir. 1992) (disallow-
ing a refund for fees used to operate a student-run newspaper because of a university's "impor-
tant educational purpose" and "narrowly tailored means of advancing" the purpose).
19971
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the Justices. 188 If the SAF funding was deemed direct, as the dissent
argued, the Establishment Clause would be violated if any money was
passed from the SAF to WAP-the inquiry would end there. How-
ever, because the majority found the SAF funding to be something
less than direct, funding WAP did not violate the Establishment
Clause as long as it was neutral. The next section discusses the role
which neutrality played in the Rosenberger majority opinion and
Justice O'Connor's concurrence, highlighting that the neutrality and
direct-funding principles were often used in the opinions
interchangeably.
C. The Different Roles of Neutrality in Rosenberger
As the previous subsection discussed, the Rosenberger majority
took pains in distinguishing the SAF funding of WAP from a forbid-
den, direct-funding case. 189 Justice Kennedy primarily relied upon the
same elements to determine that eliminating the "religious activities"
restriction from the SAF funding guidelines made them neutral. The
majority's reasoning seemed to be based largely upon the individual-
choice and diversity-of-recipient-class models of neutrality identified
and discussed in Part I of this Note. 190
The rationale of the individual-choice model-insulation from the
funding decision'91-was used by Justice Kennedy to conclude that
the university effectively separated itself from the message which
Wide Awake (and other publications) conveyed. 192 Thus, according to
Justice Kennedy, the university insured that "no public funds flow di-
188. Compare Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523 (positing that absent direct funding, the Court
has never held the neutral extension of benefits to be an establishment of religion), with id. at
2544 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that "evenhandedness" alone has never been enough to
validate a state funding of religion).
189. See supra notes 152-83 and accompanying text (grouping the majority's direct-funding
distinction into three separate arguments, and reviewing the dissenting opinion in the same
manner).
190. See supra notes 88-108 and accompanying text (discussing these two models of neutrality
as applied in prior Establishment Clause cases). The majority may have, however, also touched
upon the separability model. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522 (arguing that WAP was seeking
money for its role as a student journal, as opposed to seeking funding to support its Christian
viewpoint).
191. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text (tracking the individual-choice model of
neutrality through several of the Court's Establishment Clause cases).
192. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523. Justice Kennedy phrased this part of his analysis more in
terms of lack of endorsement than of the presence of the individual-choice model of neutrality.
See id. (arguing that the university had not "wilfully fostered or encouraged" the impression that
the university sponsors or endorses the magazine's message). However, the same principles ap-
ply to the individual-choice model of neutrality as to the so-called "endorsement test." See supra
notes 88-98 and accompanying text (detailing the individual-choice model of neutrality).
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rectly to WAP's coffers" by paying outside printers directly for their
services. 193 Therefore, because the university took no part in the deci-
sion on how the SAF funds were used, the state aid was neutral, and
the university's elimination of the religious-activities restriction did
not violate the Establishment Clause. 194
The majority also used the diversity-of-recipient-class model of neu-
trality' 95 in support of its argument that the funding guidelines would
be neutral absent the religious-activities restriction.196 As Part III
suggests, the majority's use of this neutrality model appeared to be
related to the presence of the petitioners' Free Speech claim. 197 In
any event, Justice Kennedy argued that the religious-activities restric-
tion had to be removed in order for the funding guidelines to be neu-
tral toward religion and not discriminatory. 198
Justice O'Connor's concurrence went further than the majority
opinion in addressing the neutrality of the funding guidelines. Instead
of implicitly referring to neutrality through the direct-funding analysis
as the majority did, Justice O'Connor cited several factors in support
of her argument that the guidelines would be neutral absent the
religious-activities restriction. 99 Justice O'Connor also used terms
more familiar to the direct-funding issue as support for the neutrality
of the SAF. 200
Justice O'Connor relied primarily on two factors to determine that
the religious-activities restriction had to be removed to ensure scrupu-
lous neutrality. First, she argued that the independence between the
paper and the university ensured that no message of endorsement
would be received by the public. 201 Justice O'Connor found this inde-
pendence in both the lack of the university's control over student
groups and the university's requirement that a disclaimer be included
in every correspondence from a student group.20 2 The disclaimer to
193. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2523-24.
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text (reviewing this model of neutrality as used
in two recent Supreme Court decisions).
196. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2524 (noting that "[t]he [u]niversity provides funding serv-
ices to a broad spectrum of student newspapers qualified as CIO's by reason of their officers and
membership").
197. See infra notes 249-84 and accompanying text (positing that the presence of a Free
Speech claim significantly lessens the neutrality needed to find a funding scheme constitutional).
198. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2524-25.
199. Id. at 2526-28 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 2527-28 (citing the possibility of refunds and the payments to third-parties in her
neutrality analysis); see supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (discussing these elements as
they pertain to Justice O'Connor's analysis of the direct-funding issue).




which Justice O'Connor referred stated that "[a]lthough this organiza-
tion has members who are University of Virginia students (faculty)
(employees), the organization is independent of the corporation which
is the University and which is not responsible for the organization's
contracts, acts or omissions. 20 3
Justice O'Connor also found neutrality in the number and diversity
of different viewpoints represented at the university.2 4 Indeed, Wide
Awake competed with fifteen other magazines and newspapers for ad-
vertising and readership, including publications with religious, nonreli-
gious, and even antireligious viewpoints.205 For example, the SAF
supported The Yellow Journal, which often targeted Christianity as a
subject of its satire, and Al Salom, a publication to "promote a better
understanding of Islam to the university community." 20 6 Therefore,
Justice O'Connor opined that the religious-activities restriction could
be removed without creating a perception of government endorse-
ment.2 07 Thus, the independence between the university and its stu-
dent groups and the diversity of the recipient class were the primary
indicia of neutrality upon which Justice O'Connor relied.2 08
While both the dissent and majority used the principles and termi-
nology of neutrality and direct funding throughout their opinions,
both the majority and dissenting opinions read as if the two concepts
were opposing absolutes. This type of analysis is consistent with the
Court's prior case law in that no funding scheme has ever been
deemed to be both direct and neutral.20 9 Only Justice O'Connor's
concurrence considered the two principles in unison, refusing to treat
direct funding and neutrality as mutually exclusive concepts.210 As
Part III posits, much of the Court's inconsistency could be resolved by
acknowledging that not only are the two concepts related, they are, in
fact, based upon the same objective and should be combined to form
one standard. Part III also revisits the models of neutrality discussed
above, concluding that the Free Speech claim present in Rosenberger
reduced the extent to which neutrality was considered in regard to the
Establishment Clause issue.





208. Id. at 2526-27.
209. See supra notes 29-108 and accompanying text (discussing the direct-funding prohibition,
the neutrality principle, and their application in the Court's prior case law).
210. See infra notes 232-36 and accompanying text (noting that Justice O'Connor did not
dwell on the terminology of "direct funding," relying instead on a neutrality analysis).
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III. ANALYSIS-THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIRECT FUNDING
AND NEUTRALITY IN ROSENBERGER AND BEYOND
This Note began by reciting a lengthy passage from another com-
mentator's observation of the inconsistency that has permeated
throughout the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 211 Much
of this inconsistency is due to the Court's misapplication of the neu-
trality and direct-funding principles. As the majority and dissenting
opinions in Rosenberger demonstrate, the point at which direct fund-
ing ends and neutrality begins is not always entirely clear.212 How-
ever, by ceasing to use neutrality and direct funding as opposing
absolutes and combining them into one religious-neutrality principle,
the decision in Rosenberger becomes more clearly correct.
A. A Case for Limiting the Use of the Terms "Direct Funding"
and "Neutrality"
Direct funding and neutrality can be seen as "two sides of the same
coin. '213 In Rosenberger, funding that was characterized as neutral
was deemed to be indirect in Justice O'Connor's concurrence,21 4 while
funding that was indirect was deemed to be neutral in Justice Ken-
nedy's majority opinion.215 Similarly, the dissent characterized the
funding as unconstitutional because it was direct,2 16 while the majority
found the funding to be constitutionally indirect. 21 7 Too often, the
Court and commentators speak of neutrality and direct funding as
mutually exclusive concepts. To the contrary, both principles, in fact,
have the same goal: maintaining the delicate balance between the ob-
jective of preventing state intrusion into religious matters and the re-
ality that total separation of Church and State is impossible.218
211. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 152-83 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's arguments for
distinguishing this case from direct-funding cases and the dissent's response to these arguments).
213. In his article proposing to reformulate the Lemon standards into an Equal Protection-
like analysis, Michael A. Paulsen makes a similar argument in regard to the tension between the
two religion clauses, proffering that the two clauses are actually "but two sides of the same coin,
a coin which represents the same 'value' in our constitutional democracy-religious freedom."
Paulsen, supra note 3, at 313.
214. See supra notes 184-88, 199-208 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in detail).
215. See supra notes 156-62, 167-70, 179-80 and accompanying text (summarizing Justice Ken-
nedy's majority opinion).
216. See supra notes 152-55, 163-66, 171-78, 181-83 and accompanying text (discussing the
dissenting opinion in detail).
217. See supra notes 156-62, 167-70, 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing the majority
opinion in detail).
218. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text (noting that the traditional neutrality doc-
trine was based upon the premise that religion should be neither advanced nor inhibited).
1997]
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Both the majority and the dissent took great steps to distinguish and
analogize, respectively, the SAF funding in Rosenberger from the di-
rect funding of religion.2 19 Why is it that the classification of Rosen-
berger as a direct, versus indirect, funding case was so important? The
truth of the matter is that it should not be important, as overreliance
on the distinction can lead to some absurd results.
For example, at the University of Virginia, groups obtaining CIO
status are permitted to use university computers and equipment. 220
Thus, it follows that if the university owned photocopiers and printing
presses, WAP, as a CIO, would be allowed to mass produce its maga-
zine on this equipment. On the other hand, a strict reading of the
direct-funding prohibition would not allow the university to pay the
bills that WAP incurred if it used an outside printer instead.221 Such
an illogical conclusion typifies the inconsistency in the Court's Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence.222
An argument can be made that access and funding are qualitatively
different matters. In Walz, 223 Justice Brennan distinguished a direct
subsidy from a tax exemption in that only a subsidy involves "the di-
rect transfer of public monies to the subsidized enterprise and uses
resources exacted from taxpayers as a whole. '2 24 A similar distinction
can be made between access and funding; access, like an exemption,
involves no money transfer and assists the recipient only passively.225
Arguably, access is even less similar to funding because access trans-
fers no financial benefit to the recipient.22 6 Thus, the argument goes,
direct funding cannot be permitted because it actively involves the
government in religious activity, while indirect assistance, via "ac-
cess," is permissible because it furnishes only passive assistance to reli-
219. See supra notes 152-83 and accompanying text (for a detailed analysis of the majority and
dissenting opinions).
220. Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2514 (1995).
221. Note that this is the conclusion that the dissent advocated. Id. at 2546-47 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
222. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting the apparently incoherent pattern of the
Court's case law).
223. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Walz decision).
224. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 690 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). But see Regan
v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1988) (recognizing that both subsidies and
exemptions have a similar effect on recipients).
225. But see Carolyn Wiggin, Note, A Funny Thing Happens When You Pay for a Forum:
Mandatory Student Fees to Support Political Speech at Public Universities, 103 YALE L.J. 2009,
2022 (1994) (noting that a "stark distinction between granting access to a public fora as space
and granting money for the speech within that space is superficial").
226. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1993).
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gion.227 However, why should the government be allowed to do
something indirectly which it cannot do directly?
If one disregards the active, versus passive, nature of the univer-
sity's assistance to WAP in Rosenberger and, instead, concentrates
only upon religious neutrality, the decision squares with the underly-
ing principle of the Establishment Clause-neither advancement nor
inhibition of religion.228 Upon reading the majority opinion, one must
consider whether the potential neutral extension of benefits to WAP
was the motivating factor behind Justice Kennedy's relentless attempt
to characterize the funding as indirect.229 In contrast, in his analysis of
the neutrality doctrine, Justice Souter made the argument that even-
handedness alone has never been enough to uphold a government ac-
tion which benefits sectarian institutions.230 However, by overreliance
on the fancy buzzword of "direct funding," the dissent lost sight of the
fact that both groups of Justices were actually developing the same
constitutional principle-religious neutrality.231
Justice O'Connor's concurrence, unlike the majority and dissent,
did not dwell on the "direct," versus "indirect," nature of the SAF
funding.232 Instead, she relied upon the religious neutrality of the uni-
227. This is essentially the argument that the Court has relied on in upholding benefits to
religion in access cases. For example, in the Lamb's Chapel decision, the Court stated that by
providing access, "any benefit to religion or the Church would have been no more than inciden-
tal." Id. at 395; see supra notes 100-03, 107 and accompanying text (discussing Lamb's Chapel
more fully). Similarly, in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.12 (1981), the Court distin-
guished the absence of a benefit to religion under an access policy from the financial benefit that
the church-related colleges would have received under the twenty-year restriction on religious
use struck down in Tilton. See supra note 107 (discussing the Widmar holding); supra notes 74-
79 and accompanying text (discussing the Tilton decision).
228. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text (noting that the traditional neutrality doc-
trine was intended to insure that religion is neither advanced nor inhibited).
229. See supra notes 156-62, 167-70, 179-80 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ken-
nedy's majority opinion in detail).
230. Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2540 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter used several congressional statutes to illustrate that Con-
gress reads the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence to mean that direct funding cannot
be done even if the application is evenhanded. Id. at 2544 n.9 (quoting, inter alia: 20 U.S.C.
§ 1062(b) "no grant may be made under this chapter for any educational program, activity, or
service related to sectarian instruction or religious worship, or provided by a school or depart-
ment of divinity"; 20 U.S.C. § 1132i(c) "no project assisted with funds under this subchapter shall
ever be used for religious worships or a sectarian activity or for a school or department of divin-
ity"; and 29 U.S.C. § 776(g) "no funds provided under this subchapter may be used to assist in
the construction of any facility which is or will be used for religious worship or any sectarian
activity").
231. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 350-62 (advocating an Equal Protection-like analysis for
Establishment Clause issues based, in large part, upon the same underlying value of religious
neutrality).
232. See supra notes 184-88, 199-208 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in detail).
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versity's action as a means to determine that no endorsement of reli-
gion would occur if WAP received university funds.2 33 Justice
O'Connor stressed that Establishment Clause issues can only be re-
solved by a fact-specific, case-by-case analysis of the impact that the
aid has upon religion.2 34 Thus, Justice O'Connor recognized that the
terms "direct funding" and "neutrality" are not competing concepts
but, instead, work together to protect the same value. Through the
years, the Court has lost track of this principle due to the Justices' all-
too-human need to group cases into convenient categories.2 35 Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Rosenberger provides an analysis consis-
tent with the one underlying absolute of the Establishment Clause-
religious neutrality.2 36
233. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text (discussing specifically the factors Justice
O'Connor relied on in finding neutrality).
234. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2525-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
235. See supra notes 29-108 and accompanying text (representing this author's all-too-human
attempt to break the Court's decision into direct-funding and neutrality cases).
236. The same principles at work in this religious neutrality can be seen in other commenta-
tors' proposals to use Equal Protection as at least a guiding principle in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Timothy L. Hall, Religion, Equality, and the Difference, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 1, 83-85 (1992) (discussing the role of equality and the Equal Protection Clause in Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence); Paulsen, supra note 3, at 311 (proposing to reformulate the
Lemon standards into an Equal Protection-like analysis); Matthew S. Steffey, Redefining the
Modern Constraints of the Establishment Clause: Separable Principles of Equality, Subsidy, En-
dorsement, and Church Autonomy, 75 MARO. L. REV. 903, 909 n.18 (1992) ("Much of the
Court's precedent can, in fact, be understood as enforcing principles of equality closely aligned
with equal protection principles."); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection
of Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 380-81 (1949) ("One of the chief criticisms of the Court's current
interpretation is that it fails to read the [Establishment] Clause merely as a prohibition against
preferential or 'unequal' treatment of religions. Thus, critics of the Court in effect maintain that
the First Amendment, as it deals with religion, must be read as if it were an equal protection
clause.").
An Equal Protection-like analysis was used by Justice Harlan in Walz, which was decided
before the Court had begun to overuse and over rely on the buzzwords of "direct funding" and
"neutrality." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see supra
notes 63-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Walz decision and its impact on Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence).
The Court has also used the language of Equal Protection in other Establishment Clause
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (searching for a "compelling state
interest" and the "least restrictive means" to carry out that interest); Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971) (upholding a statute because it was "tailored broadly enough that it
reflect[ed] valid secular purposes"); see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1947)
(noting that a New Jersey statute excluding payment to "private schools run for profit" could
have been susceptible to an Equal Protection challenge). An analysis similar to the Court's
Equal Protection analysis has also been used in the Free Exercise domain. See, e.g., McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 643 (1978) (White, J., concurring) (opting to use the Equal Protection Clause
to invalidate a law barring clergy from public office instead of the Free Exercise Clause).
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B. Lemon's Contribution to a Unified Standard
Although the three-part Establishment Clause test announced in
Lemon may no longer be a viable test, a review of the policies under-
lying Lemon's237 effects prong provides considerable support for elim-
inating the direct-funding terminology and advocating a religious-
neutrality analysis. 238 The effects prong of Lemon requires that the
primary effect of government action neither "advance[ ] nor inhibit[ ]
religion. ' 239 However, almost without exception, the Court has read
the word "inhibit" out of the second prong of Lemon.240 Putting the
word "inhibit" back into the effects test supports relying solely upon
religious neutrality in Establishment Clause issues.
In Rosenberger, the university's guidelines provided funding for a
variety of organizations, which expressed a variety of different
views.241 Thus, after the Court's holding in Rosenberger, WAP will be
eligible to receive funds along with many other student groups, both
secular and sectarian in nature. 242 Such a diverse class of recipients
cannot be seen to "advance" religion. However, the contrary holding
would have placed WAP at a distinct disadvantage as compared with
other student groups.243 Therefore, had the Court affirmed the Fourth
237. See supra notes 29-31, 38-42 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon decision).
238. Commentators have noted that the purpose prong of the Lemon test is a mere formality
for Establishment Clause cases for the practical reasons that statutes often have more than one
purpose, and that no legislature or governing body would be uneducated enough to propose (or
admit) a purpose of inhibiting or advancing religion. See William B. Peterson, "A Picture Held
Us Captive": Conceptual Confusion and the Lemon Test, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1827, 1830-49
(1989) (positing that the purpose prong should be eliminated due to the difficulty in ascertaining
purpose). Government action has only been held to violate the purpose prong in three cases.
See Edwards v. Aguillar, 482 U.S. 578, 585-89 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985);
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
In previous rulings, the Court has at times combined the first two prongs of Lemon to invoke
what it calls the "endorsement" test. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 ("The purpose prong of
the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of reli-
gion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice
under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.") (citations omitted).
For purposes of this discussion, the religious-neutrality model is based upon this same combina-
tion of Lemon's first and second prongs.
239. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
240. In fact, only one case has struck down an "inhibiting" government action. See Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (finding discrimination and a violation of the Establishment Clause
where a Minnesota statute imposed certain registration and reporting requirements upon only
religious organizations that solicited more than 50% of their funds from nonmembers).
241. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514-15.
242. Id. at 2522.
243. The Fourth Circuit recognized the possibility that denying funds to WAP had the effect of
inhibiting religion. However, according to the Fourth Circuit, religion was not inhibited since
WAP was granted access to campus facilities and had already proven it could publish its maga-
zine without funding. Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269,
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Circuit's holding, the effect would have "inhibited" religion in the
most classical sense, thereby violating Lemon's effects prong. By rely-
ing on the policies underlying Lemon's effects prong, as originally cre-
ated, the Rosenberger decision would have made more sense and,
therefore, support would have been gained for using religious neutral-
ity as the only guide.
A critique of the policies underlying Lemon's entanglement prong
provides further support for dispensing with the direct-funding termi-
nology.2 44 The Lemon Court measured the level of entanglement by
three considerations: "the character and purposes of the institutions
that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and
the resulting relationship between the government and the religious
authority. '245 As Rosenberger demonstrates, delving into the charac-
ter of the recipient can lead to some very different results.246 Further,
the characterization of the nature of the SAF funding as direct, versus
indirect, left the majority and the dissent in Rosenberger at an im-
passe.2 47 With this in mind, how can we expect our legislature, courts,
and school boards to determine when they are providing the forbid-
den "direct funding" of religion? A policy of strict religious neutrality
would eliminate this uncertainty caused by the direct-funding prohibi-
tion and Lemon's entanglement prong.2 48
By concentrating solely on this principle of religious neutrality, in-
stead of dwelling on the passive, versus active, nature of the SAF
funding, a much more logical decision could have been issued in Ro-
senberger. Why was the university's funding restriction unconstitu-
tional? Because the university singled out "religious activities" as less
worthy of funding than other similar activities. And why is the elimi-
285 (4th Cir. 1995). While the university's open acceptance of WAP as a CIO is noble indeed,
does not the fact that, absent SAF funding, WAP's members would have had to devote a sub-
stantial portion of their time and effort to fund-raising put WAP at a distinct disadvantage as
compared with the secular, and even antireligious, magazines that could spend their time writing
and editing?
244. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton , 473 U.S. 402, 430 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (averring
that "[t]o a great extent, the anomalous results in [the Court's] Establishment Clause cases are
'attributable to [the entanglement] ... prong"') (citing Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 681 (1980)).
245. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
246. See supra notes 152-83 and accompanying text (exploring the different characterizations
given to Wide Awake by the dissenting Justices and the majority). Perhaps the difficulty in
separating the religious from nonreligious aspects of WAP leads to the conclusion that the
separability-of-functions model of neutrality has fallen into disfavor among the current Justices.
247. See supra notes 152-83 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the no-entan-
glement test often creates a "'Catch-22' paradox whereby aid [paid] must be supervised to en-
sure no entanglement but the supervision itself ... [can] cause an entanglement").
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nation of the "religious activities" prohibition not an establishment of
religion? Because it neither inhibits nor advances a single religion or
religion in general. As a result of the Rosenberger decision, sectarian,
secular, and even antireligious activities can compete on equal footing
for access to the SAF.
C. The Effect that a Free Speech Claim Has upon Religious
Neutrality
Despite the confusion created by the Court's overreliance on the
direct-funding prohibition in Rosenberger, the majority's opinion sug-
gests that only a limited showing of neutrality is needed in Establish-
ment Clause cases involving a Free Speech claim.249 Only one of the
models of neutrality seemed to be present in Rosenberger, while two
of the traditional neutrality models appeared to be patently of-
fended.250 As Justice Souter and the dissent noted, Wide Awake mag-
azine constituted "nothing other than the preaching of the word,
which (along with the sacraments) is what most branches of Christian-
ity offer those called to the religious life."'251 Indeed, the point at
which the religious proselytizing ends, and expressing an opinion with
a religious viewpoint begins, is nearly impossible to identify.252 Is this
249. Perhaps the Court's reluctance to find an Establishment Clause violation is due in part to
the current Court's high regard for the Free Speech Clause. See Charles Fried, Forward: Revo-
lutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 69 (1995) ("For more than two decades, the Court has been
taking an increasingly libertarian and uncompromising line of freedom of speech-perhaps de-
fending in the empire of the mind the last bastion of an individualism that could not resist the
onslaught of communitarian thinking in matters more material and economic.") (citations
omitted).
250. See supra notes 72-108 accompanying text (separately discussing the Court's Establish-
ment Clause case law in terms of three dominant models of neutrality).
251. Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2535 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting). Upon perusing the first three issues of Wide Awake circulated prior to
suit, one can see that Justice Souter's characterization of the magazine is not without support.
While a complete survey of the magazines' content is not necessary for the purposes of this Note,
the following presents a sampling of excerpts found to be significant by Justice Souter: "The
masthead of every issue bears St. Paul's exhortation, that 'the hour has come for you to awake
from your slumber, because our salvation is nearer now than when we first believed."'; "Go into
all the world and preach the good news to all creation."; "The Great Commission is the prime-
directive for our lives as Christians."; "Racism is a disease of the heart, soul, and mind, and only
when it is extirpated from the individual consciousness and replaced with the love and peace of
God will true personal and communal healing begin." Id. at 2534-35 (citations omitted).
252. The Rosenberger majority would apparently agree with this argument. See Rosenberger,
115 S. Ct. at 2522 (noting the difficulty in characterizing the magazine as religious, or simply
religiously inspired). When Justice Souter joined Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, the dissent voiced a similar objection to the major-
ity's decision as Justice Souter did in Rosenberger. 509 U.S. 1, 18 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). In Zobrest, the dissent was adamant in insisting that the Establishment Clause was violated
because "[t]he two functions of secular education and advancement of religious values or beliefs
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not the antithesis of the separability model of neutrality? 253 Not rely-
ing on the lack of separability alone, the dissent argued that the indi-
vidual-choice model of neutrality was not present in Rosenberger
either, in that a third-party printer received SAF funds solely "be-
cause of its contract to print a message of religious evangelism at the
direction of Wide Awake. '254 Thus, it seems that the only model of
neutrality present in Rosenberger was the diversity-of-recipient-class
model.255
In cases in which a Free Speech claim was not present, the diversity-
of-recipient-class model of neutrality was not enough to make aid to
religion constitutional. Several cases in which the Court struck down
the use of otherwise neutral funds for religious purposes involved gov-
ernment programs that were generally available to a spectrum of re-
cipients. In Meek,256 the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania law that
sought to extend to parochial schools instructional materials and
equipment that were being made available to public schools as well. 257
Similarly, Hunt258 and Tilton259 involved large funding programs that
were available to public and private, including church-related, colleges
alike.260 Moreover, the funds involved were used for "a wide variety"
of educational projects.261 However, neither the diversity of the recip-
ient class nor the neutral purpose of the grants effected the constitu-
tional ban on using the grant monies for religious purposes. Taking
the analysis a step further, had the diversity of the recipient class been
determinative in cases like Everson,262 Bradfield,263 and Mueller,264
[were] inextricably intertwined." Id. Indeed, the interpreter provided to a deaf student attend-
ing a sectarian school communicated "the material covered in religion class, the nominally secu-
lar subjects that [were] taught from a religious perspective, and the daily Masses [which the
student would attend]." Id. at 19; see also supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text (discussing
Zobrest's majority opinion).
253. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the Court has used the
ease of separability of sectarian versus secular functions of a religious organization as one of its
dominant models of neutrality).
254. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2545 (Souter, J., dissenting).
255. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text (showing that the Court placed significant
emphasis on this model of neutrality in two of its recent cases).
256. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
257. Id. at 351-52, 363; accord Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 246 (1977).
258. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing Hunt v. McNair).
259. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (discussing Tilton v. Richardson).
260. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741-42 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 676-77
(1971). In Hunt, revenue bonds under the state Educational Facilities Authority were available
to all institutions of higher education, public and private alike. 413 U.S. at 736-37. While no
numbers were provided in Tilton, theoretically all of the nation's colleges and universities, ex-
cluding sectarian institutions, were eligible for funding. 403 U.S. at 676-77.
261. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 675.
262. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text (discussing Everson v. Board of Educ.).
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the Court's discussion of the secular uses to which the funds were put
would have been superfluous.
The United States Supreme Court decided two cases in which a
Free Speech right conflicted with a potential Establishment Clause vi-
olation in the past decade before the Rosenberger case.265 In both
cases, the Free Speech right prevailed over a potential Establishment
Clause violation. A Free Speech right appeared to affect the Court's
decisions in Lamb's Chapel 66 and Mergens;267 in both cases, the
Court reconciled the competing constitutional claims by concluding
that a policy of neutrality, based solely upon the diversity-of-recipient-
class model, created no serious danger of an Establishment Clause vi-
olation.268 From the majority's opinion in Rosenberger, it is clear that
the petitioners' Free Speech right significantly decreased the showing
of neutrality needed to deem the funding constitutional.
Focusing on a Free Speech right, as opposed to a possible Establish-
ment Clause violation, deemphasizes the particular application at
hand and emphasizes the effect of the program as a whole. Thus, the
separability-of-functions and the individual-choice models of neutral-
ity are not necessary to ensure neutrality when funding involves a pro-
tected Free Speech right. The diminished need to substantiate a
funding scheme's neutrality is evidenced by the majority decision in
Rosenberger, in which Justice Kennedy provided very little support for
his assertion that the SAF's funding of WAP would be neutral. In
fact, aside from the misapplication of the direct-funding prohibition
noted in the previous subsection, the only support for neutrality which
Justice Kennedy proffered was the diversity-of-recipient-class
model.26
9
More support can be drawn from the fact that, while the Court in-
validated the religious-activities funding restriction, it did not com-
ment on the propriety of the standard that "religious organizations"
could not become CIOs. 270 By limiting its discussion in this way, the
263. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the Bradfield decision and how the
Court used the model of neutrality).
264. See supra note 89 (discussing the Mueller decision in more detail).
265. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Board of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
266. See supra notes 100-03, 107 and accompanying text (discussing the Lamb's Chapel deci-
sion in detail).
267. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (discussing Mergens).
268. Lamb's Chapel, 509 U.S. at 390-93; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 228-31.
269. See supra notes 190-98 and accompanying text (noting that the majority of Justice Ken-
nedy's neutrality discussion focused on the same elements as his direct-funding discussion).
270. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing the prohibition of funding for
CIO activity characterized as "religious activity"); supra note 125 and accompanying text (noting
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majority implied that aid to religion needs only a limited showing of
neutrality when a Free Speech right is present, while the Court main-
tained a stricter standard of neutrality in Establishment Clause cases
not involving a Free Speech right.
The Rosenberger decision continued the Court's trend toward using
a less vigorous Establishment Clause analysis in cases involving a Free
Speech right.271 In Rosenberger, the university used its resources to
facilitate a broad and diverse array of private speech.272 This "mar-
ketplace of ideas" acted as a buffer against the establishment of reli-
gion because no single religion was favored and religion was not
favored over nonreligion.273 That is, the variety of religious messages
expressed justified what might otherwise have been an Establishment
Clause violation.274 The fact that the majority opinion discussed the
petitioners' Free Speech claim at length,275 before even reaching its
abbreviated Establishment Clause discussion,276 lends additional sup-
port to the impact which the petitioners' Free Speech right had in
Rosenberger.
that "religious organizations" were among those groups which could not be given CIO status at
the university).
271. Note, however, that the religious free speech in question must be private speech, not
government speech. The Mergens Court drew a marked distinction between government speech
endorsing religion and a person's private speech endorsing religion, finding that while the former
is prohibited, the latter is not. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250. The Rosenberger majority noted the
same distinction in regard to the SAF funding guidelines, commending the university's recogni-
tion of the difference between government speech and private speech endorsing religion, with
only the latter being permissible. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2522.
272. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2514.
273. Michael W. McConnell, the attorney for WAP, made the disadvantage of excluding
speech with a religious viewpoint from funding explicit in oral argument:
Your Honor, if their [WAP's] viewpoint were secular, they're certainly entitled to
write a magazine saying, this is our viewpoint, and you should share that viewpoint.
Animal rights groups are doing exactly that. Feminist groups are doing precisely that.
Every other group is permitted to proselytize, which I'd just like to note is nothing but
an ugly word for persuade, which is just exactly what the Free Speech Clause is
designed to protect.
Official Transcript of Oral Argument, Rosenberger v. Rector & Board of Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (No. 94-329), 1995 WL 117631, at *53.
274. The majority touched upon this notion in its analysis of the petitioner's Free Speech
claim noting that "[i]f the topic of debate is, for example, racism, then [the] exclusion of several
views on that problem is just as offensive to the First Amendment as [the] exclusion of only
one." Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518. The Rosenberger majority did not extend this rationale to
the religious perspective. However, the Court has recognized that religious groups are an impor-
tant part of the "pluralism of American society" and, along with other groups such as literary
and historical groups, contribute to the diversity of viewpoint in society. Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970).
275. Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2516-20.
276. Id. at 2521-22.
ROSENBERGER
Rosenberger was unique in that government aid was transferred di-
rectly to the religious groups, while both Lamb's Chapel and Mergens
merely involved granting religious groups access to facilities on even
terms with nonreligious groups. Establishment Clause cases such as
Lamb's Chapel, Mergens, and, most recently, Rosenberger, which in-
volve Free Speech, lend themselves to a more forgiving review of the
Establishment Clause issue than do cases which do not involve a com-
peting Free Speech right. Thus, Rosenberger has established that the
current Court will not require as strong of a showing of neutrality
when a Free Speech right is at issue.
One could take the argument a step further, asserting the possibility
that even if the diversity-of-recipient-class model of neutrality is not
present, no Establishment Clause violation will be found so long as
the guidelines for determining which groups receive the benefit of the
government decision are facially neutral. Support for this argument
might be gleaned from Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v.
Pinette,277 a case decided by the Court in the same term in which Ro-
senberger was decided. In Pinette, at issue was an Ohio statute open-
ing a ten-acre, state-owned plaza "for use by the public ... for free
discussion of public questions ... or for activities of a broad public
purpose. 2 78 A variety of different unattended displays were permit-
ted in the square, including a lighted Christmas tree and a menorah.2 79
However, the Ohio Ku Klux Klan was denied its request to erect a
cross in the square solely because the board feared an "official en-
dorsement" of Christianity in violation of the Establishment
Clause.280 In a seven-to-two decision, the Court held that the exclu-
sion of the Ku Klux Klan's cross could not be justified on Establish-
ment Clause grounds.281 Justice O'Connor deemed Pinette a more
difficult case to decide than Rosenberger because of the threat that
religious speech would dominate the forum.2 82 Thus, the Ku Klux
Klan's Free Speech right may have trumped an Establishment Clause
violation in Pinette283 without any showing of the diversity-of-recipi-
ent-class model of neutrality.
277. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
278. Id. at 2444 (citing Omo ADMIN. CODE § 128-4-02(a)(1994)).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 2445-46.
281. Id. at 2442.
282. Id. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
283. A similar argument has been made in regard to the Constitution's religion clauses, and,
therefore, is not unthinkable. Professor Laurence Tribe argues that accommodation should pre-
vail over establishment because "[s]uch dominance is the natural result of tolerating religion as
broadly as possible rather than thwarting at all costs even the faintest appearance of establish-
ment." LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1201 (2d ed. 1988). In contrast,
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The Court's increasing reluctance to find an Establishment Clause
violation in cases in which a Free Speech right is involved follows the
reality that many of the concerns which led to the drafting of the Es-
tablishment Clause are no longer present in modern times.284 It is
unlikely that President Clinton will declare the Protestant faith as the
national religion of the United States; it is also unlikely that Buddhists
or Jews will be demoted to the status of second-class citizens. In con-
trast, the right to freely express one's opinion remains an issue which
is central to modern-day jurisprudence. This author applauds the
Court's decision in Rosenberger as a step in the right direction as far
as the relationship between the Free Speech and Establishment
Clauses is concerned. However, Part IV represents this author's at-
tempt to warn against an automatic trumping of the Establishment
Clause by the Free Speech Clause. No standard can be absolute in the
area of constitutional law.
IV. IMPACT
The Court's decision in Rosenberger seems to indicate that, at the
very least, a government program benefiting religious Free Speech, in
conjunction with nonreligious and even antireligious speech, will al-
most certainly pass constitutional muster. One must consider, in the
area of constitutional law particularly, the risk of misinterpreting and
misusing what was a narrow holding into a broad constitutional the-
ory. Take, for example, the Lemon test, the overbroad application of
which has been both criticized 285 and praised 286 by commentators and
Daan Braveman has argued that the Establishment Clause should be strictly adhered to regard-
less of the Free Exercise implications. See Daan Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the
Course of Religious Neutrality, 45 MD. L. REV. 352 (1986); see also Choper, supra note 244, at
675 (positing that the Establishment Clause should only forbid government action with a wholly
religious purpose which is likely to result in compromising or influencing religious beliefs).
284. For a discussion of the historical context in which the Establishment Clause was drafted,
see Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. 2528-33 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2535-37 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing); Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1987).
285. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Cox, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court's New Establish-
ment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175 (1984); Kristin M. Engstrom, Comment, Establish-
ment Clause Jurisprudence: The Souring of Lemon and the Search for a New Test, 27 PAC. L.J.
121 (1995); Carole F. Kagan, Squeezing the Juice from Lemon: Toward a Consistent Test for the
Establishment Clause, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 621 (1995); Roald Y. Mykkeltvedt, Souring on Lemon:
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Doctrine in Transition, 44 MERCER L. REV. 881
(1993); Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993); Eric J. Segall,
Parochial School Aid Revisited: The Lemon Test, the Endorsement Test and Religious Liberty, 28
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 263 (1991).
286. See, e.g., Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The "Lemon Test," Even with All Its Shortcomings, Is Not
the Real Problem in Establishment Clause Cases, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 409 (1990); Daniel 0.
Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865 (1993).
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used and avoided by the Court.287 In Lemon, Chief Justice Burger
predicted the impact that the decision seems to have had: "in consti-
tutional adjudication some steps, which when taken were thought to
approach 'the verge,' have become the platform for yet further steps.
A certain momentum develops in constitutional theory and it can be a
'downhill thrust' easily set in motion but difficult to retard or stop. '288
Whether the Court's decision in Rosenberger is indicative of a
greater accommodation of religion or of a more libertarian view of the
Free Speech clause by the Court remains to be seen. Certainly, the
holding in Rosenberger, which, in essence, forced the University of
Virginia to pay the printing costs of a magazine advocating the Chris-
tian religion, has the potential to be misused and overextended in
much the same way as the Lemon test has been. If Rosenberger was
the first step towards signaling the Court's reluctance to use the Es-
tablishment Clause when a Free Speech claim is present, Pinette,289
which involved a public, as opposed to a limited public, forum may
have been the second step.
Perhaps Rosenberger will be more significant for the questions it
left unanswered than for the Establishment Clause guidance that it
provided. For example, the Court did not strike down the prohibition
against funding religious organizations, as opposed to religious view-
points, from the university's funding guidelines. 290 Thus, the question
remains whether the Court's rather liberal standard of neutrality used
to assess a case of viewpoint discrimination also applies when only
content-based speech discrimination is involved.
The Court also failed to include in its neutrality analysis the signifi-
cance of the potential that, even with religiously neutral funding stan-
dards, large religions might threaten to dominate the forum. This
problem can be illustrated by looking at the SAF funding guidelines
subsequent to the Rosenberger decision. Absent the religious-activi-
ties restriction, all funding decisions at the University of Virginia will
be based upon the following criteria: (1) the size of the organization;
(2) the financial self-sufficiency of the group; and (3) the university-
287. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
288. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971).
289. See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Pinette case).
290. Presumably, this means that a group of young Mormons that attend the University of
Virginia and call themselves the "Young Mormon Coalition" (a "religious organization") who
publish a magazine which is general in nature, but that is written from a religious perspective,
could not receive SAF funding; conversely, the same group, if it called itself the "Young People
for a Better World" (a nonreligious organization, with a "religious viewpoint") could receive
funding if it published the same magazine.
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wide benefit of the activity.291 With the "new" funding guidelines at
the University of Virginia, less-populated faiths appear to be at a dis-
tinct disadvantage to the larger religions. Is this not the very vice
which the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent? In the fu-
ture, the Court will have to address the constitutionality of neutral
government aid to religion whose benefits are distributed unevenly
between religions because of the sizes of the religious sects.
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Burger once stated that "[t]he considerable internal
inconsistency in the [Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence] de-
rives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping of utter-
ances ... that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have
limited meanings as general principles. ' 292 The confusing manner in
which the United States Supreme Court handled the direct-funding
and neutrality principles in Rosenberger v. Rector & Board of Visitors
of the University of Virginia provides considerable credence to this no-
tion. While the Court's decision seemed to conform to the value of
religious neutrality upon which the Establishment Clause was con-
structed, the Court's decision would have made more sense had the
Court used just one standard-religious neutrality. More signifi-
cantly, the Rosenberger decision continues the Court's trend of al-
lowing a Free Speech right to alter its Establishment Clause analysis.
In effect, Rosenberger has taken most of the teeth from the Establish-
ment Clause in challenges to government-aid schemes that affect a
Free Speech right.
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